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DOG WORDS ~ OR, HOW TO THINK WITHOUT LANGUAGE 
Mariam Motamedi Fraser 
 
ABSTRACT  
This paper is situated in the context of debates about animals and language, and animal-human 
relations. It is also informed by the argument that words are neither the exclusive property of 
language (Motamedi Fraser 2015), nor the exclusive property of humans. The paper illustrates 
this point by exploring how some companion dogs make 'dog words' with their bodies and, 
further, how they are able/can be enabled to transform the meanings of these words by 
inventing and/or participating in word encounters. In the spirit of Lev Vygotsky, the paper 
argues that such encounters are a way of thinking with words in 'complexes.' Through a series 
of concrete examples, the paper shows how intimacy is integral to this thinking, in its every 
dimension. The ethically optimistic dimension of this analysis, however, simultaneously draws 
attention to how fragile are the relations between dogs, humans, and words, and how proximate 
intimacy is to 'other kinds of relations.' With this in mind, the paper addresses three 'other kinds 
of relations' that potentially limit animal-human 'talking' and thinking: scientific behaviourism, 
speciesism, and 'languagism.'  
 
KEY WORDS 
companion dogs, Vicki Hearne, word encounters, ethics, behaviourism, speciesism, 
languagism. 
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DOG WORDS 
OR, HOW TO THINK WITHOUT LANGUAGE 
Mariam Motamedi Fraser 
 
Sit! 
Fetch! 
Sit-Fridge! 
 
How does one establish intimacy with a domesticated dog (canis familiaris)? The vast 
contemporary literature on companion dogs and their 'guardians'/handlers in north European 
and North American societies tends to focus on how emotional and affective relations are 
generated through social and material practices (such as the intimacy of living together in the 
same household, often for many years), bidirectional physical care and support for one another, 
and, especially in the light of recent research on the co-evolution of dogs and humans, shared 
neurophysiological mechanisms, such as the release of oxytocin (also known as the 'cuddle 
chemical' and the 'hug hormone') by way of gazing and stroking, which reduces stress and may 
enhance human-canine 'affiliative behaviours' (Uvnäs-Moberg et al. 2015). The striking 
absence of words in most of these accounts (excluding the much broadcast health benefits, to 
humans, of monologuing at your dog), finds a curious resonance with the 'turn to animals' in 
the social sciences and humanities, which Kari Weil proposes could also be described as a 
'counter-linguistic turn’ (Weil 2012: 11). 
 
Curious, because scholars who work on/with animals are often much preoccupied by language. 
Necessarily so, for language has long been the vehicle, especially in western philosophy, 
through which animals are denied 'the right and power to "respond,"' and, hence, 'many other 
things that would be the property of man' (Derrida 2002: 400). By way of a counter to such 
claims of human exceptionalism, researchers have developed theories of communication that 
seek to dislodge the apparently privileged relation between humans and language. With regards 
to humans, for example, theorists continue to interrogate those aspects of language that once 
secured the autonomous, self-reflexive, self-governing subject (the humanist subject) on which 
human exceptionalism mostly rests, and to develop challenging accounts of communication 
that bridge and/or complicate the boundaries between animals and humans (e.g. Wolfe 2003). 
With regards to animals, researchers have shown how the evolution of language is linked to 
activities such as 'territory mapping, spatial navigation, and foraging' (Haraway in Wolfe 2010: 
41), or how all life is semiotic – representational, but not necessarily linguistic (Kohn 2013). 
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Today, even Noam Chomsky will admit that language in its narrowest sense – that is, 'the 
recursive ability to "generate an infinite range of expressions from a finite set of elements"' 
(Wolfe 2010: 41, references omitted) – cannot be considered a solely human capacity.  
 
In this paper, I too seek to engage with the question of animals, humans, and language. I do so, 
however, from a different and more concrete angle. I foreground this issue of concreteness 
because, while I am sympathetic to the debates described above and share their agenda, I am 
struck by the level of their abstraction - which can on occasion lead, I think, to a neglect of the 
rich and varied ways that words are deployed in practice by both humans and some animals. 
Here, therefore, I will be asking not after the conceptual dimension of language, but the 
pragmatic use of words; not after shared linguistic operations, but on-goingly negotiated 
meanings; not after obedience (or compliance, as trainers more often describe it today), but 
specific modes of existence (Despret 2008). I will be exploring these issues in relation to three 
dogs – Bandit, Salty, and Monk – and the particular dog words they use, in particular situations. 
In each case, it will be not their referential understanding of words that will be of interest, but 
their intimate relations with them. In short, I will be concerned less with whether a dog 
'understands' a word (in the way, say, that his owner does), and more with what a dog in an 
intimate relation with a word can do. 
 
Intimate relations with words is another way of describing what I have, elsewhere, called non-
linguistic word relations. I argued in Word (Motamedi Fraser 2015) that although words are 
ubiquitous, relations with words are mostly rather narrowly confined (unsurprisingly) to 
language. And yet, while it is true that words are recognized as such through language, their 
force is not always defined by it. Close attention to 'words themselves' reveals that histories 
and theories of words and language are often divergent, and that words can flourish in many 
complexly non-discursive assemblages. In Word, I developed an account of the bodily, sensory, 
affective and non-conscious relations – the intimate relations - that some humans have with 
words, as these are shaped by the sound, feel, touch, taste, place, position, speed, and direction 
of them. In this regard the analysis in Word could be understood to be oriented by a question 
posed by Lauren Berlant in the introduction to her special issue of Critical Inquiry on intimacy. 
'What happens,' Berlant asks, 'to the energy of attachment when it has no designated place? To 
the glances, gestures, encounters, collaborations, or fantasies that have no canon?' (Berlant 
1998: 285). Word was an attempt to think through the 'energy of attachment' to words, outside 
the canon of language. 
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In this paper I extend the argument that words can generate meaning without first passing 
through language, and that words can forge and are forged through intimate relations, to dogs. 
I want to suggest that some companion dogs make 'dog words' with their bodies and, further, 
that they are able/can be enabled to bend and transform the meanings of these words through 
specific word encounters. I will explore this notion of 'word encounters,' and its implications 
for debates about animals and language, by posing a contrast between Vicki Hearne's 
understanding of dog gestures (which are ultimately linguistic) and my understanding of dog 
words (which are not). Although I will be drawing on other theorists also, who address either 
human or conspecific communication exclusively, my own argument is confined to companion 
dog-human communications. 
 
Intimate entanglements are woven into this account in several ways. First, some companion 
dogs – arguably many such dogs - have intimate relationships with words, by which I mean 
they know how to make and use them. This is how it comes about, second, that words, dogs 
and humans can become entangled in word encounters that are themselves a locus for the 
establishment of intimate relations between dogs and humans. Finally, word encounters are 
also sites for experimentation, where a dog is able/enabled to create new meanings for words 
by bringing together potentially diverse, but nevertheless intimately familiar, resources in 
novel combinations. Concreteness, specificity, non-discursivity, intimacy: these are the tools 
that I will use to argue that words are neither the exclusive property of humans, nor are they 
the exclusive property of language.  
 
In addition, where Cary Wolfe seeks to disarticulate 'the category of language and the category 
of species' (Wolfe 2003: 38), my parallel goal is to disarticulate language and thinking. Dogs, 
I suggest, do not use words unthinkingly; on the contrary, words can be a part of what enables 
a dog to think. I am not proposing that using words is the only or even the primary way that 
dogs think. It is, however, an arguably especially significant method by which dogs invent the 
opportunity to shape the worlds they share with humans, and through which, moreover, dogs 
and humans can think together. Herein lies the ethical significance of these relations: when 
intimacies with words are enabled to flourish, a dog can use words not only 'to control, or at 
least influence, his [or her] environment' (Despret 2008: 125) but also to resist the invitation to 
be confirmed as 'stupid' (Despret 2015). Nevertheless, the ethically optimistic dimension of 
this analysis – '[i]ntimacy was supposed to be about optimism, remember?' (Berlant 1998: 288) 
– simultaneously draws attention to how fragile intimate relations between dogs, humans and 
words are, and how proximate they are to (or 'haunted' or 'threatened' by, Berlant writes) 'other 
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kinds of relations' (Berlant 1998: 282).1 'Other kinds of relations,' here, point most obviously 
to scientific behaviourism and speciesism, which I will address in the penultimate section of 
this paper, and to what I will call 'languagism,' which is the subject of the conclusion.  
 
 
PLAY BITES AND PARADOX 
I begin with a brief account of Gregory Bateson's analysis of monkey play, and Cary Wolfe's 
critique of it. This serves as an introduction to what is at stake in some of the debates about 
animals and communication, and also highlights some of the tensions that are generated by the 
demand that communication be simultaneously abstract and specific.  
 
In his chapter on play and fantasy, Bateson argues that play can only occur successfully (i.e. 
will not degenerate into combat) if the animals in question are 'capable of some degree of meta-
communication, i.e., of exchanging signals which would carry the message "this is play."' 
(Bateson 1987: 185). Following his observation, during a visit to a zoo, of monkeys at play, 
Bateson proposes that 'the playful nip denotes the bite, but does not denote that which would 
be denoted by the bite' (Bateson 1987: 189). The message 'this is play' is denotative insofar as 
it bears propositional content - it may be confirmed or denied, believed or not, considered true 
or false. In this regard it is distinguished from 'the rules and contingencies of relationship' 
(Bateson 1987: 371) and, as such, represents an 'important step in the evolution of 
communication' (Bateson 1987: 186). In relationship, Bateson writes:  
 
Always the relata are perceptibly present to illustrate the discourse, and always the 
discourse is iconic in the sense of being composed of part actions ('intention 
movements') which mention the whole action which is being mentioned. Even when 
the cat asks you for milk, she cannot mention the object which she wants (unless it be 
perceptibly present). She says, 'Mama, mama,' and you are supposed from this 
invocation of dependency to guess that it is milk that she requires (Bateson 1987: 150-
151).  
 
                                                   
1 Berlant contrasts intimate relations to 'other kinds of relations.'  Please see, however, articles 
in this volume which show how 'other kinds of relations' - violent, pathogenic and parasitic in 
Giraud et al's chapter for example, and scientific as well as local relations in Friese's chapter – 
may also be characterised by intimacy. 
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The cat's mewing instantiates dependency. The play bite by contrast, despite – in Bateson's 
view - its iconic resemblance to the non-play bite, does not instantiate a combative, non-play, 
relationship. The monkeys' perceived ability to generate and recognise denotative signs – 
intentional biting movements that do not map on to actual biting intentions - is significant for 
Bateson because it suggests that playing monkeys are able to understand and manipulate a 
metacommunicative frame (Wolfe 2003:41). Indeed Bateson argues that paradox is critical to 
the success of monkey play: 
 
Paradox is doubly present in the signals which are exchanged within the context of play, 
fantasy, threat, etc. Not only does the playful nip not denote what would be denoted by 
the bite for which it stands but, in addition, the bite itself is fictional. Not only do the 
playing animals not quite mean what they are saying but, also, they are usually 
communicating about something which does not exist (Bateson 1987: 188). 
 
The 'discovery' that 'signals are signals' – or rather, that they are 'only signals, which can be 
trusted, distrusted, falsified, denied, amplified, corrected, and so forth' - gives rise to 'all the 
complexities of empathy, identification, projection' (Bateson 1987: 184, my emphasis), as well 
as the complexities of deceit. Language – by which Bateson means the language of not only of 
humans but also, for example, of bees - follows from this: from 'the possibility of 
communicating at [a] multiplicity of levels of abstraction' (Bateson 1987: 184).   
 
The argument is both exhilarating and troublesome. Exhilarating, because Bateson considers 
animal play not in terms of its function as a behaviour, which is how play is often (narrowly) 
conceived in animal research, but as an illustration of social and cognitive skill, which is the 
kind of interpretation more commonly reserved for humans. It is troubling however because – 
and this is Cary Wolfe's concern (with which I am sympathetic) - Bateson's analysis 'remains 
tied to an essentially representationalist frame' (Wolfe 2003: 43). To take just one example: 
Wolfe argues that Bateson is committed to an essentially 'objective' view of the world in which 
animals 'internalize the environment in the form of "representations" or even "information,"' 
and that they do so more or less accurately, depending on 'the sophistication of their filtering 
mechanisms' (Wolfe 2003: 43). Bateson, in short, 'continues to believe in "objective" or 
"correct" interpretations of heterophenomenological observations' (Wolfe 2003: 43). One 
might ask, in view of this critique, whether Bateson's visual 'filtering mechanisms,' which 
implicitly undergird his identification of both a resemblance and a difference between play 
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bites and a non-play bites, is necessarily all there is to it (or is more than there is to it), as far 
as a monkey is concerned.2 
 
Although many of the debates that have followed from Bateson's analysis of play are 
preoccupied with the issue of representation, Wolfe notes that, '[f]or Bateson … it may be that 
"the great new thing" in the evolution of human language is not "the discovery of abstraction 
or generalization, but the discovery of how to be specific about something other than 
relationship" – to be denotative about actions and objects, for example' (Wolfe 2003: 40, 
references omitted). Herein lies my own difficulty with Bateson's analysis: it implies that, 
unless 'being specific' is rendered flexible by some meta-communicative, usually linguistic, 
operation such as denotation (which allows for a message to be possibly about play or possibly 
about combat or possibly undecided), it must be narrowly fixed by way of relationship. But 
surely there are other ways of being specific? Over the following two sections I will argue that 
the way dogs use words, in non-linguistic word encounters, allows for both specificity and 
flexibility, concreteness and elasticity. This analysis is intended to ease somewhat the broader 
polarization of this debate, in which either animals have a meta-communicative relation to the 
world or they have no access to sophisticated communication at all. I will explicate this point 
first, with reference to the use that a dog called Bandit makes of the word 'Sit,' and then 
illustrate it with an analysis of the use that a dog called Salty makes of the word 'Fetch!' For 
the sake of clarity, I will also refer to my own dog Monk's use of Sit-Fridge! by way of further 
example. 
 
DOG GESTURES 
For the rest of this article I will be drawing on Vicki Hearne's book best-known book Adam's 
Task (2007a) and her less-cited Bandit (2007b). Hearne, who received an award in 1992 for 
outstanding literary achievement from the American Academy of Arts and Letters, was an 
animal trainer, philosopher, poet and novelist. Her books are often referenced in studies of 
animals (see for example Haraway 2008; Patton 2003; Weil 2012) where she is seemingly 
much respected, while at the same time often accused of anthropomorphism and, especially 
when it comes to the subject of animal rights, of humanism (Wolfe 2003: 1-11). With regards 
to her dog work, Hearne was schooled by the controversial William Koehler, and both used 
                                                   
2 Visual likeness would almost certainly be incomprehensible as the foundation for an 
explanation of dog bites, which are understood by dogs, according to Hearne, not by how they 
look but by what they are (Hearne 2007b: 229).  
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'training' techniques and tools (such as choke collars, tabs, bats, light lines and throw chains) 
that, today, are rightly condemned by animal trainers and behaviourists. Hearne's positions in 
all these areas have unfortunately, as Carol Adams notes, been 'left fixed by her death' (Adams 
2006: 125) in 2001, at the age of 55. Hearne's training philosophy is nearly always read through 
the lens of language, and justifiably so. She was especially influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and Stanley Cavell, and writes about training as though it were a grammar: 'Whenever I say, 
"Bandit, Sit!" you have to assume this formal posture. If you sit crookedly, or ahead of me, or 
only after a few moments of continuing to study the robin, that is ungrammatical' (Hearne 
2007b: 77).  
 
For Hearne, as for Donna Haraway, training is one way to try to establish relationships – albeit 
unequal relationships - with animals (Weil 2012: 59). Training gives animals 'tokens' (Hearne 
2007b: 69) through which, if the handler is any good, they are enabled to have their 'say.' There 
are no guarantees, however, that the 'new world' (Hearne 2007b: 70) that a new vocabulary 
inaugurates will not itself turn out to be impoverishing. ("'I didn't think it would turn out this 
way,"' Berlant writes, 'is the secret epitaph of intimacy' [Berlant 1998: 281]). The following 
extract will serve as an example, and also introduces Hearne's conception of 'sitting' as a 'family 
of gestures.' She writes:  
 
Diminishment is a thing that can be learned, a thing dogs can learn in relationship to 
people, and learn it as we do through new vocabulary words when the new words 
displace instead of learning to dance with the old ones, or the old versions of 
themselves. When you teach a dog to sit through dominance, or through so-called 
positive rewards, such as biscuits, you diminish his world by reducing the complex of 
meanings that the family of gestures we call 'sitting' can have to the impoverished 
meanings, referents, and emotions at work in phony (human) games of 'pack leader,' or 
worse, far worse, you strip the gesture of any possible referent beyond 'dog biscuit' 
(Hearne 2007b: 71). 
 
The rights or wrongs of Hearne's training methods are not under discussion here. What is of 
(ethical) note is Hearne's assertion that the diminishment of the gesture 'sit' is a diminishment 
of the dog: it turns the dog into a sitting-machine. As I understand it, the binding of the gesture 
sitting to a biscuit means that the biscuit becomes its sole association or connection. 'Sit' = 
biscuit. Not only, when taught in this minifying way, is the gesture yoked (from the dog's 
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perspective) to a single outcome (a food reward), it is also reduced to nothing more than a 
stimulus. And what else can one expect from a dog, in reply to a stimulus, than a reaction?3  
 
'A computer,' Hearne writes, 'is not restless with intelligence, and so is quite happy for a given 
"word" – the command key plus "v" - to continue meaning one and only one operation until 
the end of time' (Hearne 2007b: 74). A dog, by contrast, who is not a machine, learns by using, 
or by 'projecting' as Hearne puts it, a gesture into new contexts.4 Hence while formal training 
is a way of tying down the potential meanings of a gesture – '[i]n an obedience trial you don't 
want your dog to woolgather, experimenting with new meanings of "Sit"' (Hearne 2007b: 73) 
– in everyday life, a gesture can be a tool with which a dog can learn about the world, and even 
try to organise it according to his own satisfaction. This is what Bandit does. For instance: 
having been ignored by Vicki (who is writing a paper), Bandit gains her partner Robert's 
attention by using the posture that shows he needs to go out. When Robert gets the leash 
however, Bandit leads him to Vicki, where he sits until she finally concedes to take him. Once 
outside it transpires that Bandit does not want to pee at all but rather 'indicate[s] quite plainly, 
by heeling with enormous precision whenever I moved off toward another tree … that he 
wanted to work' (Hearne 2007b: 70). Hearne writes: 'I have not asked the dog to mean "I'm 
ready for work," but the dog has projected the gesture so that it now does' (Hearne 2007b: 73). 
Such projections, with all due respect to Bandit, are hardly exceptional. Monk regularly 
'projects' the gesture sitting into 'I'm ready for food' by adopting this posture in front of the 
fridge.  
 
So far, so much in common. Why, then, does Hearne describe sitting as a gesture, and not as a 
word? After all, a dog's gesture, as Hearne describes it, shares many of the properties of a word 
in language. A word in language is an interesting thing: although it must have a certain degree 
of visual, sonic/aural and semiotic elasticity – an elasticity that will enable it to be recognisable 
despite its different material instantiations - such elasticity is not limitless, for obvious reasons. 
                                                   
3 I write this with the prejudicial contrast, between reacting to a stimulus (such as hunger or 
pain) and responding to a question (such as 'did you really mean that?'), in mind (Steiner 2005: 
20-21). 
4 Hearne's implicit distinction, between a computer/machine and a dog/subject, is problematic. 
Partly because, historically, this distinction is more nuanced that it is often given credit for (see 
for example Riskin 2016), and partly because contemporary developments in machine learning 
are raising new and challenging questions about the status of machines. 
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Language, one might say, is an obedience trial for words; words in language are words in 
formal training. A dog's gesture too, as it is conceived of by Hearne, is at once relatively plastic 
(I understand, for example, that although Monk's bottom is not quite on the ground he is 
nevertheless attempting to 'sit' in front of the ball I am about to throw) and relatively 
constrained (jumping up at the ball is not at all the same thing as attempting to sit in front of 
it). Thus it is that Hearne can describe sitting as a 'family of gestures' whose variations might 
be comfortably compared, say, to different styles of handwriting, or different accents. 
 
Or perhaps not so comfortably. For Hearne, a dog's gesture is both the 'signifier and thing 
signified in one motion' (Hearne 2007b: 76). This is why, contra Bateson's claim that 'playing 
animals [do] not quite mean what they are saying,' Hearne argues forcefully that a dog always 
means what he says. Dogs, she writes, are incapable of the 'tricks of abstraction that give our 
species the ability to produce self-reflexive objects such as the liar's paradox or sentences that 
read "This sentence is false"' (Hearne 2007b: 76). A sit executed during an obedience routine 
is not therefore a false sit, but rather the true exercise of loyalty, friendship and commitment 
(Hearne 2007b: 76). This is just one of Hearne's many examples of a dog's projection of the 
meaning of the gesture 'sit.' The sheer number of her examples, however, serves as a caution 
that the uses a dog might make of this gesture extend further than any formal training would 
allow, or any language could contain. What word in language, for instance, could stretch so far 
as to mean not only 'Please can you take me out' and 'I'm ready for work' – which is how Bandit 
uses the word 'sit' - but also, as Hearne describes 'sit' elsewhere, '"I don't know what that noise 
is, boss, but I don't think it's gunfire," or "That man isn't drunk, he's dead," or "There's a person 
lost in this thicket," and … "I don’t know how that garbage got in the hallway!" (Hearne 2007b: 
73).  
 
In the end, I think Hearne is right to call sitting a gesture and not a word. For if the meaning of 
the word 'sit' – understood as a word in language - were really so extensive (so flexible, so 
unspecific), it would lose all meaning entirely. But this is also why, while I agree with her that 
training gives dogs a vocabulary (Hearne 2007a: 21), I am less convinced that it is a grammar, 
or that dogs are obedient not only to trainers but also to language (Hearne 2007a: 56). A dog's 
gesture operates linguistically in Hearne's work, but the relations between training, grammar, 
and language are metaphorical.  
 
DOG WORDS 
 11 
For the sake of simplicity and continuity, I will begin by framing my account of dog words in 
terms of signs and signifiers, as Hearne does. But: rather than collapse the two elements of a 
sign (recall that, for Hearne, a gesture is 'the signifier and thing signified in one motion'), I 
would argue that a dog word – a 'sit,' or 'heeling with enormous precision' - is a signifier to 
which no signified is attached. A dog makes a dog word by shaping her body into a particular 
position, or by moving her body in a particular way (in the way of a retrieve for example), just 
as a spoken word is made by the sound that is shaped by the face, mouth, larynx, etc. and a 
written word is made by the movement of the hand and the marker.5 A dog makes a word with 
her body, and this is all that she makes, no more and no less than a word.  
 
Although I am privileging the signifier over the sign here, I am not suggesting that a dog word 
has no meaning, or that a dog does not mean what he says. On the contrary, the conceptual 
dimension of the sign is suspended only until the dog word arrives at its meaning by way of the 
relations that constitute it. These relations are not with other words – to be blunt: Monk uses 
words, but he does not make sentences – but with close-to-hand and familiar resources that 
enable a dog to intimate. 'To intimate,' Berlant writes, 'is to communicate with the sparest of 
signs and gestures, and at its root intimacy has the quality of eloquence and brevity' (Berlant 
1998: 281). To return to my previous example: it is with the greatest eloquence and brevity that 
Monk generates the meaning 'I am ready for food' by putting the sitting posture into a relation 
with a fridge - with a specific fridge, with our fridge, with the fridge with which he is intimate, 
and not with just anyone's fridge. As Hearne's work warmly illustrates, dogs are especially 
adept at insisting, in this way, on the established meanings of words, and also at creating for 
them new connections. I will illustrate this point in more detail, in the following section. 
 
My claim has many progenitors, one of which is especially suggestive with regards to the 
argument about dogs, words and thinking that I am developing here. It is Lev Vygotsky's 
arresting proposal that, in humans, linguistic competence and the development of thought 
advance separately, and that it is only at puberty that they 'cross and mutually inform each 
other' (Steiner 2005: 29). I come to Vygotsky's work through Gary Steiner, who uses it in the 
                                                   
5 Of course speech and writing are not entirely equivalent to gesture, and my assertion here that 
they are cannot undo the centuries of (western) prejudice that has aligned nearly all forms of 
signing with the 'primitive, rudimentary, and animal' (Taylor 2017: 51). See Taylor for a 
discussion of sign language and the categories of race, disability, and animality (Taylor 2017: 
47-55).  
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context of his argument that '[f]undamental to the task of understanding animal experience is 
the problem of conceptualizing animal consciousness in terms that do not require recourse to 
concepts and propositional attitudes' (Steiner 2005: 27). Before I briefly address Vygotsky's 
thesis, it is worth noting that both his work on animals, and on children, which was written 
during the 1930s, has been contested; but also that it is not the scientific accuracy of this work 
which is at stake here. Nor am I claiming that either dogs or humans, when they 'think in 
complexes,' as Vygotsky puts it, are like children. Instead, I find in Vygotsky's fearless 
approach a rare example of a theorist who attempts to break down the gates, as it were, of the 
'prison-house of language' (Jameson in Weil 2012: 12) without leaving words behind to fester. 
 
Vygotsky argues that, while children use words that resemble those of adults, '[t]he child's 
framework is purely situational, with the word tied to something concrete, whereas the adult's 
framework is conceptual' (Steiner 2005: 30). Children, according to Vygotsky (but there are 
surely other categories of people that might be included here, such as some painters and poets), 
think in 'complexes.' This means that they 'group or associate different particular objects in 
virtue of perceived similarities, commonalities, or relationships' (Steiner 2005: 30). So too, one 
might argue, do dogs. For example: dogs are vulnerable to what B. F. Skinner called 'animal 
superstitions,' superstitions that result from 'mistaking' a coincidental relationship, say, for a 
causal one (Skinner 1948). This disposition makes classical conditioning possible through the 
pairing of a neutral stimulus, such as the sound of a tone, with a naturally occurring stimulus, 
such as food, in order to elicit a learned response, like salivating. It also obliges owners to be 
careful that their dogs don't make associations between objects or events and emotions, such 
as fear. Temple Grandin describes the case of Red Dog who, following a traumatic event with 
a single hot air balloon, ultimately became afraid of all red, round objects seen against a blue 
sky (Grandin and Johnstone 2006: 223-224). Vygotsky would probably describe Red Dog's 
relationship with red, round objects as somewhat 'pseudoconceptual' which, in the context of 
thinking in complexes, is about as close as it is possible to get to conceptual generalisation. 
The pseudoconcept remains pseudo however, Vygotsky writes, because it is 'only an 
associative complex limited to a certain kind of perceptual bond' based on a 'concrete, visible 
likeness' (Vygotsky in Steiner 2005: 30). Or as Grandin diagnoses Red Dog: 'she was over-
generalizing in a hyper-specific way' (Grandin and Johnstone 2006: 224).6  
                                                   
6 It happens that Red Dog was over-generalising in the mode of visuality, which is the sense to 
which Vygotsky refers in his analysis of pseudoconcepts. While visual perception may be the 
most common basis of pseudoconcepts, it is not the only sensory mode through which dogs 
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At first glance, my application of 'thinking in complexes' to dogs hardly seems encouraging: 
first, because Vygotsky is writing about children, and the implied comparison between children 
and dogs is, I think, unhelpful; second, because 'associationist principles' are often linked, as I 
indicated above, to the dismal models of stimulus-response that define behaviourist theories of 
learning, but which have little to say about how those associations are forged in practice (other 
than that they are strengthened by spatio-temporal contiguity and can be manipulated by 
intervals and ratios of reinforcement); and finally, because Red Dog is suffering. Nevertheless, 
'thinking in complexes' is not inherently negative, nor are the modes by which the elements in 
a complex are connected necessarily limited to visual likeness. Indeed: '[w]hile a concept 
groups objects according to one attribute, the bonds relating the elements of a complex to the 
whole and to one another may be as diverse as the contacts and relations of the elements are in 
reality' (Vygotsky in Steiner 2005: 30). 
 
Although it is precisely this diversity which prevents me from offering any general definition 
of what are ‘the bonds’ that secure the meaning of a dog word in advance, they are likely - as 
I have already noted - to be informed by intimacies, of whatever kind. Dogs, like most humans, 
do not make or use words ex nihilo. But unlike most humans, a dog will often bring a dog word 
together with new combinations of elements or resources that may appear somewhat arbitrary 
from the 'outside' but which, from the 'inside,' from the 'inwardness of the intimate' (Berlant 
1998: 281), have all the coherence of the familiar. Monk brings to the Sit-Fridge complex an 
infallibly accurate sense of time and timing based on his intimate relationship with the different 
temporal rhythms and habits of members of the household. ('Since you are about to go to the 
fridge anyway ….'). To think in complexes, as Vygotsky describes it, is to think in intimate 
relations. And to think with complexes, which is how I would develop the point, is to be so 
intimately implicated (in a complex, in thinking), as to transform those relations from within. 
Further progenitors of this argument then, would be theorists of the encounter: 'Something in 
the world forces us to think,' Deleuze writes. 'This something is an object not of recognition 
but of a fundamental encounter' (Deleuze 1994: 139).7 
                                                   
over-generalise. For the sake of interest: Grandin notes that '[a]nimals seem to over-generalise 
within the sensory channel that first frightened them' (Grandin and Johnstone 2006: 224). This 
is also true of humans, of the war veteran, for instance, who jumps at loud bangs. 
7 Hence my emphasis on the diversity and particularity of the bonds that secure a complex. In 
his helpful discussion of how theories of relationality differ from those of the encounter, Martin 
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WORD ENCOUNTERS 
I have argued, first, that a dog's gesture, as Hearne understands it, does indeed operate 
linguistically (at least in some respects), as she claims. I also suggested however that, despite 
the temptation that follows – which is to identify a dog's gesture as a word - the novel meanings 
that Hearne and I both agree dogs bring to the gestures they make with their bodies are too 
expansive to enable them to be defined as a word in language. This is unquestionably why 
Hearne, who is a conscientious writer, never conflates the two. Nevertheless, in part in order 
to bring a fresh perspective to debates about animals and language, and in part to draw attention 
to rich diversity of both human and non-human pragmatic word practices, I proposed, second, 
that a dog's gesture can be understood to be a word, if a word is understood as part of an 
'associative complex' or encounter. Inventing associative complexes or participating in word 
encounters is a way of making and using words (non-referentially), and also a way of thinking 
(concretely). In an associative complex, meaning is generated when any number of ostensibly 
'disconnected' entities are brought together on the basis of 'perceived similarities, 
commonalities, or relationships.' While the bonds that define such relationships will necessarily 
be many and varied (Monk and I, for instance, especially with our different umwelts, identify 
similarities very differently), they will always be situational, and specific. It is for this reason, 
I wager, they will also intimate. 
 
In this section I want to contrast Hearne's and my own (now more fully developed) 
understanding of a dog's gesture once again, and to further explore the implications of our 
differences – for dogs, for words, for thinking - in the light of something that Hearne's own 
dog Salty did, which Hearne describes a 'form of dishonesty' (Hearne 2007a: 73). This 
reference to dishonesty is challenging with regards to my conception of dog words, because 
dishonesty and other similar practices are usually explained, as they are by Bateson for 
example, with reference to some notion of metacommunication. And this, both Hearne and I 
am arguing, is not how dogs communicate with humans. How, then, is it possible for Hearne 
to describe something that Salty did as a 'form of dishonesty'?  
 
                                                   
Savransky underscores the importance of how things come together: 'what allows for 
qualitative differences between things to be discerned is the specific trajectories and habits they 
inherit, the particular social order that each grouping enjoys' (Savransky 2016: 93). 
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During a retrieving exercise, when Hearne calls Fetch!, Salty picks up a stick instead of the 
dumbbell that Hearne has thrown for her. Initially Hearne wonders whether, by picking up the 
stick, Salty is saying something paradoxical like 'It's not this one but that one' (Hearne 2007a: 
73). But about this interpretation, Hearne continues, 'there are some queer things:' 'For one 
thing, I assume that Salty doesn't imagine that I don't know the difference between the stick 
and the dumbbell' (Hearne 2007a: 73). Hearne rejects the idea that Salty is being paradoxical 
on largely empirical grounds: because she (Hearne) insists on recognising that the stick is not 
the dumbbell, and because she believes that Salty is aware of this, they cannot be said to be 
engaged – as Bateson's monkeys are – in a game that is based on the mutual suspension of 
disbelief. This is how it comes about that Hearne, alternatively, charges Salty with lying. But 
note: Salty is 'lying about herself, not about the dumbbell. She wants me to believe that she 
believes I meant the stick rather than the dumbbell' (Hearne 2007a: 73).  
 
Although this certainly makes Salty sound as if she is mired in a web of linguistic recursion, in 
fact Hearne's conclusion is consistent with her claim, which I discussed earlier, that a dog's 
gesture is both the 'signifier and thing signified in one motion' (Hearne 2007b: 76). Since there 
is no 'space' between Salty's retrieve gesture and what Salty means by it, there is no space for 
Salty to be lying about anything but herself. (In effect, Salty is what Salty does). This is an 
improvement, in my view, on the proposal that Salty is lying about the dumbbell (Hearne's first 
proposal, which she rapidly dismissed), not least because it goes some way to dodge the 
anthropomorphic bullet that would almost inevitably pursue it. That is, the irresistible 
temptation to ask why is Salty lying about the dumbbell, and to answer in terms like: because 
she is sloppy; because she does not care what Hearne wants; because she is wilful and 
disobedient; etc. But still, Hearne's conclusion remains constraining because it privileges only 
one relation – the relation of Salty to herself - and, notably, because it excludes a fuller 
discussion of Salty's relation to the retrieve, and therefore of her responsivity, which Hearne 
describes elsewhere as the dog's 'power' (Hearne 2007b: 78).  
 
I want to propose that if Salty is lying at all, then she is lying about more than either the 
dumbbell or herself. This is because, in order to be an 'honest' dog, a dog who means what she 
says, the 'lie,' one might say, must be total, must encompass all the elements in the Fetch! 
encounter - which includes Hearne, Salty herself, the cue 'Fetch!', the throw, the retrieve, the 
stick, and the dumbbell - as well as the relations between them. And of all the possible relations 
that constitute this encounter in its specificity, the most intimate among them is surely Salty's 
relation to the dog word 'retrieve.' For the retrieve is the raison d'etre of Salty's part in the 
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encounter and the mode of her engagement. It is the dog's response to the human's request, the 
dog word answer to the human word 'Fetch!.' It is the word that Salty is given to make, and the 
only meaning therefore that she can potentially manipulate. How does she do this? Not by 
extending the meaning of the dog word 'retrieve' so far that it turns it into a different word 
altogether (which is what Hearne's understanding of a dog gesture permits), or by replacing the 
meaning of the same dog word - by replacing a 'genuine' retrieve, for example, with a 'playful' 
retrieve (as Bateson might suggest) - but rather, simply, by connecting the dog word 'retrieve' 
to something different: to the stick, which now qualifies as the proper object of the retrieve, 
and not to the dumbbell, which is now legitimately ignorable. In this way, Salty makes the 
same word differ from itself.  
 
For me, a dog always means what she says because the meaning of a dog word is always arrived 
at by way of a particular encounter. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this specificity – of relations 
and modes of relationality - gives dog words a greater pliability than is available to words in 
language. (And also arguably makes them less likely than words-in-language to become a 'trap,' 
as Latimer and López, in the introduction to this volume, argue they so often are). Salty's Fetch! 
illustrates that when the relations that constitute a dog word changes, the word in itself comes 
to differ from itself. In practice Hearne, I believe, would not disagree. The 'curious thing about 
dogs,' she writes, 'is that the more talent they have for retrieving, the more they tend to think 
of inventive variations of this maneuver' (Hearne 2007a: 73). Or: the more intimately 
implicated they are in the dog word 'retrieve,' the more thought-full their encounters with it are 
likely to be.  
 
ENTANGLEMENTS OF ETHICS AND POWER 
Of course a word is not a wand, and Salty cannot simply magic new meaning into being. In the 
encounter described by Hearne, the Fetch!-Hearne dyad exerts a special force, determining to 
some degree that it is the dumbbell that must be retrieved, and not the stick. (I say 'the Fetch!-
Hearne dyad,' rather than Hearne, because there is a long history enfolded into the word 
'Fetch!,' which administers anyone who uses it). Clearly, as Paul Patton notes in his analysis of 
Hearne's training philosophy, 'relations of communication are not external but immanent to 
relations of power' (Patton 2003: 91). The cue 'Fetch!' is an exercise of power, even if it 
'recognizes and engages with those things that are important to [dog] being' (Patton 2003: 97). 
The point returns me to the uncomfortable proximity between 'the utopian, optimism-
sustaining versions of intimacy' (with which I have been mostly preoccupied in this paper) and 
'the normative practices, fantasies, institutions, and ideologies' (Berlant 1998: 282) to which 
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they are vulnerable. It also suggests that power as an analytic, as Kanyeredzi et al. propose (in 
this volume), cannot always capture the subtle ways in which intimate relations between 
'unequal' parties are created and sustained in practice (see also in this volume Ramírez-i-Ollé 
on the complexities of friendship). 
 
One might describe scientific behaviourism as an especially well-entrenched set of normative 
practices, fantasies, institutions and ideologies – or as an apparatus, as Vinciane Despret (2008) 
succinctly puts it - that exerts a certain pressure on dogs and their handlers. As such, it is one 
of those 'other kinds of relations' which, as I noted in the introduction, threatens 'the image of 
the world [that intimacy] seeks to sustain' (Berlant 1998: 288). I wrote earlier that when the 
word 'sit' is reduced to a stimulus (via a biscuit), a dog is reduced to a sitting-machine. I used 
this term purposefully, in order to recall the Cartesian paradigm of animals as machines, and 
the consolidation of that paradigm in Skinner's radical behaviourism which foregrounds stimuli 
and reactions, and which considers all mental states to be epiphenomena. Hearne's entire 
oeuvre is a protest against this behaviourist model of learning, as her emphasis on response – 
the other side of that historical coin – illustrates. But it is also a warning, for she knows how 
readily a word – a dog word no less (although of course she does not use this term) - can be 
deployed against a dog to reduce and curtail his or her world. Referring to the Bandit-Robert-
Sit encounter described earlier, Hearne writes: 
 
[T]hat is a work, and also a learning, because [Bandit] learns in part through his own 
intention and in part through Robert's response that this is what one version of 'Sit' now 
means. …. When a leap such as Bandit performed with Robert is not acknowledged, 
the nascent meaning the dog is imagining … will subside, vanish. And now things are 
not the way they were before he did this, because the imagination, unlike a computer, 
can subside into the muddle and murk of disappointment at the failure of meaning … 
failures of syntax are not primarily failures of a rule-governed sequence, but rather of 
response (Hearne 2007b: 76-77). 
 
In these few sentences, Hearne implicitly imputes to Bandit nearly every capacity that (until 
recently) has been contested in the history of western philosophical and scientific theories 
about animals - intentionality, imagination, emotions, learning (including learning 
disappointment), and responsivity – and she shows, too, how easily they can be repudiated. 
Easily, because as Hearne describes them here, very few of these capacities belong solely to 
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the dog (if they did, he might be better placed to defend them); rather, they are distributed 
across/emerge out of the encounter between the dog, the human, and the gesture/dog word.  
 
Such co-constitutions of capacities are described by Despret as exchanges and extensions of 
subjectivity, or as 'intersubjectivity' (Despret 2008: 135). By this she means: 'becoming what 
the other suggests to you, accepting a proposal of subjectivity, acting in the manner in which 
the other addresses you, actualizing and verifying this proposal, in the sense of rendering it 
true' (Despret 2008: 135). It means that, if Bandit and Salty think with Sit! and Fetch!, and if 
Monk thinks with Sit-Fridge!, it is not because they are reflecting on an abstract vocabulary of 
potentially denotative words/gestures or on an archive of objects that they hold in their heads 
(slyly plotting, all the while, to use one rather than another), but because they are confident that 
their dog word inventions will engender a response – what Hearne, elsewhere, calls the 'varied 
flexions of looped thoughts' between the dog and the handler (Hearne 2007a: 58). The stakes 
in a word encounter are thus very high, for failing to acknowledge or respond to potential 
meaning is likely to lead to the profound injustice of stifling thinking. Indeed by not responding 
to a dog 'projection,' Hearne writes, '[t]he behaviorist's dog will not only seem stupid, she will 
be stupid' (Hearne 2007a: 59). Conversely (or nearly), as Despret wryly notes in her analysis 
of Irene Pepperberg's work with Alex, a grey parrot, 'no parrot has ever spoken to a 
behaviourist' (Despret 2008: 124).  
 
The implications of Hearne's claim, that the behaviourist's dog will actually be stupid, have a 
bearing not only on a behaviourist relation between dogs and humans but also on a further kind 
of 'other relation,' (other to intimacy), which is speciesism. I understand speciesism here not as 
Peter Singer describes it – as a prejudice in favour of the interests of one's own species (Singer 
2015: 6) -  but rather as a 'dangerous and misleading' practice, which supposes 'that attributes 
or behaviours "belong" to the creatures who display them, even [if] these creatures seem to be 
the only ones who exhibit a particular quality' (Tyler 2009: 15). For if it is the case that 
capacities such as thinking, learning, responsivity, or 'stupidity' are not inherent to dogs but 
are, rather, distributed across a specific apparatus, then it becomes at least difficult, if not 
probably impossible, to speak meaningfully of the capacities of any species in general 
(including the human species). This is why Despret argues that, even though Alex 
demonstrated that he could accomplish tasks 'that were hitherto considered as exceeding the 
capacities of non-humans' (Despret 2008: 125), he cannot be considered to be representative 
of all parrots. What Alex represents (or rather, to what Alex testifies) is 'the possibilities that 
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the [Pepperberg-Alex] apparatus could actualize' (Despret 2008: 128).8 And so it is with word 
encounters, where making, using, acknowledging and responding to dog words is also about 
making, using, acknowledging and responding to the potential becomings of dog-human 
intersubjectivities, which include the possibilities of dog-human thinking. A word encounter, 
in short, is a site where intersubjectivities and thinking are enabled to flourish; and also where 
they may be demolished. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It does not go without saying, unfortunately, that domesticated dogs, having lived intimately 
with humans for thousands of years, have also lived intimately with and among words. 
Although there is, so far, very little research into how exactly this may have affected the 
development of any (or even many) of their abilities, and particularly their exceptional ability 
to establish relationships with humans, recent studies suggest that words matter to dogs in ways 
that far exceed 'mere' intonation (Andics et al. 2017); that dogs are able to develop a referential 
understanding of nouns and may understand sentences (Pilley and Reid 2011); and that some 
dogs prefer verbal praise to food rewards (Cook et al. 2016). 
 
Studies like these will take their place in a well-established tradition of research which seeks 
to explore the relations between animals and human language. As such, they raise an intriguing 
question: will dogs be able to improve on the notably poor track record of those animals to date 
who have been trained or taught to use words or numbers by humans, but who are nevertheless 
more often than not the subjects of ridicule or disappointment? (Despret 2015; Pepperberg 
2008; Hess 2008). It seems unlikely – for no matter how adept with words an animal might be, 
their efforts are often dismissed on the grounds that they have no real understanding of 
language. This dismissal takes the heat out of the 'intellectual emergency' (Hearne 2007a: 18) 
that Hearne suggests too frequently follows from an animal's perceived use of language, and 
also serves to re-establish language as 'the brick-solid border' (Seshadri 2012: 12) that divides 
humans from all other animals. It is a symptom of what I would call languagism. 
                                                   
8 It is notable that Pepperberg (1999) turned the kind of 'response-ability' that I have been 
discussing into a formal methodology, and that she defines it, explicitly, against the apparatuses 
of behaviourism and language. Pepperberg is not alone among scientists, and especially 
cognitive ethologists, who are troubled by the reduction of a species to a single animal 
'ambassador' (see for example Horowitz 2012: 9). 
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Languagism is as ugly as the word sounds. It is evident in the provocation (to wonder, for 
instance, or outrage) that many people feel when animals come to words and/or language, and 
it is evident in research, whether in science or philosophy, that is captivated by those aspects 
of language – such as abstraction, representation, interiority, and the relation between language 
and thinking - that are deemed important from a human perspective. My argument here has 
focused, by contrast, on the concrete and pragmatic uses that dogs make of words by 
experimenting with dog words in word encounters. I have argued, in the spirit of Vygotsky, 
that this a way of thinking with words in complexes – which is not to suggest that words are 
where dogs do most of their thinking. Rather, my attention to dog words should be understood 
as an expression of this paper's implicit preoccupation with, and critique of, languagism.  
 
The optimism that often animates intimate relations, as well as analyses of them (Berlant 1998), 
is not entirely misplaced however. Concrete work with animals in farms (Porcher and Schmitt 
2012), in training (as I have illustrated here), and in research laboratories (like Pepperberg's) 
indicates that words and, more exactingly, their meanings, are not cast in the iron of language 
exclusively. The choice is not, therefore – and here I am returned to the broader context of the 
argument - between skilled metacommunication and 'act[ing] or be[ing] one end of a pattern 
of interaction' (Bateson 1987: 280) nor is it between words-in-language and wordlessness. This 
is important, first, because many domesticated animals do have intimate relations with words, 
which is something worth recognising and reflecting upon in itself. Second, because their 
creative uses of words are a reminder of how restricted word-worlds are often conceived to be, 
and how much more diverse and fertile they are in practice. And third, because thinking about 
things like words differently can potentially open up new ways of thinking about animal-human 
intimacies, and how they are established. '[I]n the 'best farms,' Despret writes, 'talk is incessant. 
And because there is talk, there is talking back' (Despret 2008: 133). One might consider such 
talk and talking back to be an ethical barometer of animal-human relations. To be, that is, one 
of the ways through which a particular animal or animals, with a particular human/humans, 
negotiate how they are going to become together, for better or for worse.  
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